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ABSTRACT 
Natural disasters in the u.S. demonstrate the lack of and need for integrated 
disaster plans for the u.S. dairy industry. It is demonstrated how a spatial 
model of the Northeast dairy industry can be used to assess and analyze potential 
impacts of local and regional disasters on market levels in the industry. A 
hypothetical radioactive release from a nuclear power plant reactor in the North­
east provides an example. 
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OVERVIEW
 
Although various federal, state, and local agencies have provlslons and 
plans dealing with disasters generally, little attention is given to the needs 
and concerns of specific food industries, such as the dairy industry. In the 
event of a catastrophe, food supply and distribution quickly become key concerns. 
Events in California and the Carolinas and the 1986 Chernoby1 reactor explosion 
demonstrate the need for developing integrated disaster plans for the food 
industry, including the farm, processing, and retail distribution sectors. A 
brief description of disaster planning theory is given and a model of the 
Northeast dairy sector is used to illustrate the issues and provide concrete 
examples for a hypothetical release from a nuclear power plant operation in 
Oswego County, New York. 
In practice, disaster planning in the United States is a function provided 
by local and state governmental agencies, and consequently the quality of such 
planning varies across the country. The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974 
provides for federal assistance and intervention only when the scope of the 
disaster is greater than the combined capabilities of both state and local 
authorities to manage effectively (U.S. Congress 1987). The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has been criticized repeatedly by the General Accounting 
Office, among others, for its "poor implementation of programs in such areas as 
hurricane preparedness, earthquake mitigation and preparedness ... as well as in 
preparedness and mitigation efforts in general" (Waugh 1988, 121). Although it 
has been named as the lead agency for a number of different types of disasters, 
FEMA itself considers its role in disaster mitigation to be supplementary. 
Disaster researchers classify disaster planning in terms of four general 
categories: preparation, response, recovery, and prevention (Quarante11i 1987). 
Preparation planning can be defined as "activities closest to the onset of a 
disaster which minimize damage and enhance disaster response operations" (Waugh, 
113). Efforts such as stockpiling supplies, setting up telephone notification 
networks and organizing personnel can all be characterized as preparation 
activities. 
Response planning pertains to those activities that occur immediately after 
a disaster and are considered primarily the responsibility of local (and 
sometimes state) emergency response personnel. Firemen responding to a fire at 
a chemical dump, or paramedics tending to victims of a tornado are both examples 
of response activities. 
Recovery planning - dealing with the aftermath of a disaster - is the level 
at which the federal government agencies, such as FEMA and the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), and private agencies, such as the Red Cross, operate, 
providing monetary and material assistance to disaster-stricken areas. However, 
well-intentioned plans may, and often do, run afoul of unforeseen problems. The 
USDA made government stocks of nonfat dry milk available to the Red Cross for 
distribution after the October 1989 earthquake in California. However, the 
shortage of potable water in a number of areas made reconstitution difficult. 
In fact, a number of dairy plants, on an unorganized and voluntary basis, sent 
in tank trucks filled with water to help alleviate the shortage. 
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Prevention planning, among other things, involves zoning and land use 
restrictions in floodplains, coastal areas and geologically active sites, in an 
attempt to limit the number of people and industries exposed to the kind of 
disasters to which some areas are known to be prone. Prevention planning is not 
very popular because it tends to restrict economic choices in the short-run. 
Given the schema above, it is clear that disaster planning for the dairy 
industry would most logically fit into the response and recovery categories. 
With the exception of a FEMA guidance on monitoring radiation levels in milk 
after a commercial nuclear power plant reactor accident (FEMA REP-12), there is 
no planning in place specifically for the dairy industry on either the federal 
or state level. 
To the extent that any disaster planning takes place, it is generally 
incident-specific. In the wake of the October 1989 earthquake, several of 
California's dairy cooperatives began to discuss the need for independent 
contingency planning that addresses the larger concerns of the industry. Such 
a planning effort in any part of the country would need to take into account the 
three basic market levels of the industry, namely, farm milk production, milk 
processing, and dairy product consumption. As a preliminary step in this 
planning process, a spatial model is used to assess and analyze potential impacts 
of local and regional disasters on each sector of the dairy industry. As a 
disaster example, a radioactive release from a nuclear power plant located on 
Lake Ontario is used. Potential impacts are analyzed within the framework of the 
Northeast Dairy Sector Simulator. 
THE NORTHEAST DAIRY SECTOR SIMULATOR 
The Northeast Dairy Sector Simulator (NEDSS) is a highly disaggregated 
transshipment and plant location model that combines network flow and facilities 
location methods (Pratt et al. 1986). The model draws on the dairy plant 
location formulation described by King and Logan in 1964, and modified in later 
dairy sector analyses by Beck and Goodin (1980), Boehm and Conner (1976), Buccola 
and Conner (1979), Kloth and Blakley (1971), and Thomas and DeHaven (1979). It 
builds on the plant location application discussed by Fuller, Randolph, and 
Klingman (1976), on the transhipment model described by McLean et al. (1982), and 
on the dairy sector networks constructed by Babb et al. (1977) and Novakovic 
et al. (1980). 
NEDSS differs from its precursors in the degree of its spatial aggregation; 
it is considerably more disaggregated when compared to similar models. This is 
made possible by the use of recently developed solution algorithms (Grigoriadis 
1986) and access to the computational capabilities of a supercomputer. 
Typically, dairy plant location models have been forced to severely restrict the 
size of the problems that they analyzed. Normally, this required limiting the 
numbers of possible supply or processing points, or independent analyses of each 
dairy product class. In addition, the movements of processed products from 
processing to consumption points were ignored in most earlier analyses. 
The problem solved by NEDSS can be described as a single commodity 
transshipment problem. A transshipment problem is a network flow problem in 
which there are supply, demand, and transshipment nodes that are connected by 
directed arcs. A directed arc is an ordered pair of nodes (i,j) which represents 
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the possibility of a flow (Xi,j) (milk or milk products in this problem) from the 
first node to the second. For example, in Figure I, circles, triangles and 
squares represent supply, processing, and consumption nodes respectively. 
Directed arcs, represented by arrows, connect pairs of nodes of each type. 
Directed arcs from supply (circles) to processing (triangles) represent the 
assembly of milk from farms and delivery to processing plants in bulk form. 
Associated with each arc is a bulk milk transportation cost per unit (aij ) and 
a capacity (Ci,j)' Arcs connecting processing nodes (triangles) to processing 
nodes (triangles) represent the conversion of farm milk into consumable dairy 
products at each processing location. These arcs also have associated per unit 
processing costs and processing capacities. Arcs connecting processing 
(triangles) and consumption (squares) represent the distribution of processed 
dairy products to consumption centers. These also have associated distribution 
costs and capacities. 
SUPPL Y PROCESS IN:J CONSUMP TI ON 
Nodes (237) (1,520) (1,520) (m) 






FIGURE 1. Network Structure of NEDSS 
For each node i' there is an associated number b i such that 
If b i < 0, then node i is a supply node (circle). If b i > 0, then node i is a 
demand node (square). Finally, if b i - 0, then node i is a transshipment node 
(triangle). 
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The network	 flow problem is 
minimize E E aijXij
i j 
subject to EXji - EXij = bi 
j j 
where bi is negative for supply, positive for demand and zero for transshipment 
nodes. A solution to the transshipment problem is feasible if the flow on each 
arc is no larger than the capacity of that arc, and the sum of flows in to any 
node minus the sum of flows out of that node is equal to the associated b i for 
that node. The cost of the network is equal to the sum, over all the arcs, of 
the flow on each arc times its cost. A transshipment problem is solved when a 
feasible solution of minimum cost is found. 
NEDSS allocates raw milk and manufactured product supplies among processing 
and consumption centers on the basis of transportation costs (both milk assembly 
and dairy product distribution), and on the basis of individual plant processing 
costs and capacities. Farm milk production, dairy product processing, and 
consumption centers, as well as the flows of milk and milk products between these 
centers, can be constrained to simulate the effects of a disaster at either a 
single or multiple market level. 
The Northeast dairy industry is viewed at three market levels: production, 
processing, and consumption, as shown in Figure 1. To represent the farm milk 
production in the Northeast, 236 points representing single counties or 
aggregations of counties in a 13-state area were chosen, as shown in Figure 2. 
At the processing level, milk is assumed to be processed into one of five product 
classes. Class I consists of fluid milk products, and includes whole, 2%, skim, 
buttermilk, and flavored milk drinks. Class II consists of 'soft' products and 
includes half and half, light cream, heavy cream, sour cream, cottage cheese, and 
frozen desserts. Class III is hard cheese, Class IV is butter, and Class V is 
nonfat dry Inilk. 
A concerted effort was undertaken to identify actual dairy processing 
facilities in the study area. Three hundred twenty-three fluid plants, 98 soft 
product plants, 74 cheese plants, and 13 butter and nonfat dry milk plants were 
catalogued. Each plant was assigned to one of 303 city locations used in the 
model, with some cities functioning as the site of two or more plants. In this 
manner, 147 of the 303 city locations were permitted to function as potential 
processors of Class I products in the following scenarios. Similarly, 71, 47, 
and 11 city locations were permitted to process Classes II, III, and combined IV 
& V products, respectively. These aggregated processing centers for each product 
class are shown in Figures 3 to 6. All product groups from each class are 
assumed to be consumed at the retail level, and 153 dairy product consumption 
centers, representing single or multiple counties, were chosen within the 13­
state area, as shown in Figure 7. Milk production, processing, and dairy product 
consumption activities outside the Northeast region are accounted for in the 
model, and are depicted as points outside the region (in Figure 9 and following 
figures). No extra-regional Class I processing is allowed to occur. 
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FIGURE 2. 236 Aggregated Farm Milk Production Centers 
FIGURE 3. 146 Aggregated Class I Processing Center Locations 
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FIGURE 4. 71 Aggregated Class II Processing Center Locations 
FIGURE 5. 47 Aggregated Class III Processing Center Locations 
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FIGURE 6. 11 Aggregated Classes IV and V 
Processing Center Locations 





A base scenario, in which processing locations were optimized for least 
manufacturing and transportation costs, is shown in Figures 8 to 11 for all 
product classes. Weighted average milk assembly and distribution distances 
within the study region for each product class are reported in Table 1. Figure 
8 depicts Class I supply to processing and processing to consumption movements. 
The longest supply center to processing location distance was 266 miles, between 
Wellsboro, PA and Levittown, NY, while the longest processing to consumption 
distance was 82 miles, from Abingdon, VA to Bluefield, WV. Figures 9, 10 and 11 
depict assembly and distribution movements for Classes II, III, and combined 
IV & V, respectively. The longest Class II distribution movement, 369 miles 
between Canton, NY and Boston, MA, was over two and a half times greater than the 
longest Class II assembly movement. Similar patterns exist for cheese, butter, 
and nonfat dry milk. The longest distribution movement for butter was nearly ten 
times greater than the longest butter assembly movement. This reflects that fact 
that it is less costly to transport the finished product (ice cream, cheese, 
butter, or powder) than the bulk milk used in its manufacture. 
PLUME SCENARIO 
To illustrate the use of the model, a radioactive release from the Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 reactor in Oswego, N.Y. is postulated. Nine 
Mile 2 is a steam turbine boiling water reactor (Energy Information Administra­
tion 1990), and is located, as shown in Figure 12, in an area in which dairying 
is an important agricultural activity, Figures 13. Oswego County and its six 
neighboring counties accounts for nearly 25% of New York's total milk production. 
A significant release of radioactive material that included iodine-13l, 
strontium-90 and cesium-137 (the isotopes of most concern in milk), would 
certainly have devastating impacts on the regional milkshed. 
Although design differences between Soviet and American reactors make a 
Chernobyl-type accident impossible in the U.S., other design flaws found in U.S. 
plants could produce effects similar in kind to Chernobyl. Nine Mile Point has 
had a history of operating problems, the most recent of which (August, 1991) 
resulted in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, the second most serious 
emergency classification category possible, and one which has only been invoked 
a total of three times since the classification system was created in the wake 
of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. On August 13th, 1991, according to 
reports, a transformer failed at the facility, causing a power surge which 
tripped circuit breakers for the main turbine and major power system. Safety 
monitors, main control room equipment and the main computer were knocked out 
(Schneider August 14). Although there were two independent backup systems that 
were supposed to provide an alternate power source in the event of just such a 
failure, both of them failed as well (Wald, August 15). The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission is conducting an investigation of the mishap, and investigators have 
indicated that the flaws found in Nine Mile Station's electrical system may be 
extant in other nuclear plants as well. No radioactive material was released 
during this event. 
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Closs I Supply 10 Processing 
Movements 
FIGURE eA. Base Class I Assembly Movements 
toCloss I Processing 
Consumption Movements 
FIGURE eB. Base Class I Distribution Movements 
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Closs II Supply to Processing 
Movements 
FIGURE 9A. Base Class II Assembly Movements 










Supply to Processin9 Closs III 
Movements 
FIGURE lOA. Base Class III Assembly Movements 
FIGURE lOB. Base Class III Distribution Movements 
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FIGURE ItA. Base Classes IV and V Assembly Movements 





FIGURE lIB. Base Classes IV and V Distribution Movements 
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FIGURE 12. Location of Nine-Mile Point Nuclear Station. 
with 50-mile Radius Emergency Planning Zone 
Table 1. Base Milk Assembly and Distribution Movements 
Weighted Average Weighted Average 
Assembly Distance Distribution Distance 
(mi. ) (mi. ) 
Class I 84.2 5.9 
Class II 17.5 143.6 
Class III 27.5 160.1 
Class IV 21.4 346.7 
Class V 27.5 197.5 
Note: In calculating the weighted average distances. movements to or from extra-regional 
points were excluded. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, the release quantity and composition, 
shown in Table 2, was selected to exceed federal Protective Action Guide 
emergency levels. The PAG levels are established for what the federal government 
calls "critical populations." For radioiodine, the critical population consists 
of newborn infants, (including fetuses); while for all other isotopes, the 
critical population is infants under one year old. The total release chosen for 
the scenario was twenty-five million curies of radiation, delivered over sixty 
hours. The release quantity and duration are roughly one quarter of that 
estimated for the Chernobyl accident of 1986. Calculations for infant thyroid 
and whole body dose rates and totals, as well as an estimated plume path were 
generated using a Nuclear Regulatory Commission public domain computer software 
program called IRDAM (Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Model). Centerline dose 
calculations are shown in Table 3; the plume path is depicted in Figure 14. It 
was assumed that the wind was blowing steadily from the northwest at fifteen 
miles per hour for the duration of the release. It is important to emphasize 
that the magnitude of the release was not chosen for its likelihood but rather 
for its impact. While an accident on that scale is theoretically possible, it 
is considered unlikely by emergency management planning personnel. 
Table 2. Release Characterization 
Release Duration: 60 hours Gross Release: 25,000,000 Ci 
Total Release: 115.74 Ci/sec 
ISOTOPIC MIXTURE (Ci/sec) 
Isotope Ci Isotope Ci 
*Krypton-83m 4.40 *Xenon-l35 4.46 
*Krypton-85m 4.46 *Xenon-l37 4.46 
*Krypton-85 4.46 *Xenon-l38 4.46 
*Krypton-87 4.46 Cesium-l34 5.79 
*Krypton-88 4.46 Cesium-l37 5.79 
*Krypton-89 4.46 Iodine-l3l 37.00 
*Xenon-13lm 4.46 Iodine-l32 2.31 
*Xenon-133m 4.46 Iodine-l33 2.31 
*Xenon-l33 4.46 Iodine-l34 2.31 
*Xenon-135m 4.46 Iodine-l35 2.31 
*Noble gases. 
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Table 3. Centerline Dose Calculation 
Downwind Travel Whole Body Infant Thyroid
Distance Time 
(hr:min) (remsjhr) (rems) (remsjhr) (rems)(mi) 
0.3 0:1. 2 1.0500 63.000 2850.000 171,000 
0.6 0:2.4 10.0296 17.700 801. 667 48,100 
1.2 0:4.8 0.0835 5.010 226.667 13,600 
2.0 0:8.0 0.0330 1. 980 889.667 5,380 
5.0 0:20.0 0.0063 10.376 17.000 1,020 
10.0 0:40.0 0.0018 0.108 4.883 293 
FDA Emergency Protective Action Guides 
Iodine-131- 15 rem (thyroid) 
Cesium-134- 5 rem (whole body) 
Cesium-137- 5 rem (whole body) 
(Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Modell 
Milk from farms found to be contaminated with radioactive isotopes and 
therefore unfit for immediate consumption can be either disposed of (dumped) or 
processed into storable form (butter or nonfat dry milk), depending on the degree 
and kind of contamination. Radionuc1ides begin to appear in milk within 10-12 
hours after the ingestion of contaminated forage. Radioactivity levels peak 
between 24 hours and several days after the release. Therefore, pasture and 
animal monitoring must begin as soon after the release event as possible, in 
order to prevent contaminated milk from entering the human food chain. Iodine­
131 has a relatively short half-life (eight days) and if the isotope is present 
in fairly low concentrations, it is safe to process contaminated milk into nonfat 
dry milk and store it until the radioactivity decays. However, cesium isotopes 
have a considerably longer half-life (on the order of years, not days), and if 
concentrated, as would be the case in manufactured products, would render storage 
problematic. 
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FIGURE 13. 1988 Milk Production Shares for Selected 
New York Counties (Total equals 23.1%) 
FIGURE 14. Radioactive Plume Path and Affected Counties 
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Whether consumers would be willing to consume products made from this milk 
is another question. In the wake of Chernobyl, a number of countries set newly 
stringent radiation level regulations for milk product imports. Products made 
from milk tainted by Chernobyl fallout were refused entry into Brazil and 
Malaysia because of government and consumer safety fears. Shipments of nonfat 
dry milk from seven European countries (Austria, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, and Britain) to Brazil were found to contain levels of 
radioactive cesium far in excess of the maximum levels permitted for use in 
Europe (New York Times 12 Jan. 1987). As late as January 1988. nearly two years 
after the disaster, a West German export company was embroiled in a scandal over 
plans to ship heavily contaminated milk powder to Angola and Egypt. The company 
contended that its understanding was that the powder destined for Angola would 
be mixed with other ingredients and used for animal feed only, while the official 
Angolan press agency reported that it was to have been used in hunger relief 
(New York Times 10 Jan. and 31 Jan. 1988). However, the severity of the 
contamination discussed here precludes the use of the affected milk supply in any 
way. The milk supply located under the plume path, which on an annual basis is 
equal to 1. 2 billion pounds, is assumed to be dumped. Populations in the 
affected counties are held constant, although the model is capable of 
incorporating the results of crisis relocation plans by reallocating the 
population numbers of affected counties to the appropriate host counties. 
The results suggest that the consequences of such a significant drop in New 
York State's milk supply are felt through the entire region, for all product 
classes. Table 4 delineates the optimal number of processing locations in both 
the base and disaster solutions. While there was a net loss of one location for 
Class I processing (resulting in a million pound increase in average pounds 
processed per plant), a new location in Pennsylvania became active in the plume 
scenario. Class II activity changed substantially on the state level. Maine, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia increased activity, while New York and Virginia 
decreased. Although the quantity processed was unchanged, average pounds 
processed per plant dropped from 327 million to 303 million pounds. This change 
was the result both of an additional processor entering the solution, and the 
model-determined downsizing of the largest processor from 838 million pounds to 
775 million pounds. Activity in Class III processing within the region showed 
a decrease of 505 million pounds (6.6%), which was absorbed by outside 
processing. Maryland Class III processing declined by over 40%, with Maine, New 
York, and Vermont down significantly. The remaining classes of products showed 
a consistent gain in outside processing at the expense of regional activity. 
Class IV changes resulted in the loss of all Vermont processing as well as an 
increase in average pounds processed per plant of 50% -- from 1.695 billion to 
2.543 billion pounds. Class V processing decreased significantly in Maryland and 
Pennsylvania (by 21 and 25 percent respectively). 
Preliminary comparisons of assembly and distribution costs before and after 
disaster indicate that for Class I, costs for milk assembly were less expensive 
in the plume scenario, by approximately $1.4 million, but much more expensive to 
distribute (by approximately $1.2 million). For Class II, the converse is true. 
Assembly costs were greater in the plume scenario (by $.2 million), but 
distribution costs were about $1.2 million less than in the base scenario. 
Assembly costs associated with outside processing of Classes III, IV and V are 
not calculated; hence it is not possible to compare changes in total assembly 
- 17 ­
Table 4. Number of Northeast Dairy 
Processing Facilities 
Class Base Plume 
Class I 102 101 
Class II 13 14 
Class III 35 33 
Class IV 3 2 
Class V 10 9 
Total 163 159 
versus distribution costs. One obvious effect is that more dairy products must 
be obtained from outside the region. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The reorganized structure suggested by NEDSS could be used as a guideline 
in response and recovery activities. The model incorporates a highly detailed 
road network system that is used in calculating least cost transportation routes. 
The road system is also used in determining alternative milk and product routing 
in the event that roads are closed or inaccessible. Additions to the road system 
in the form of other road segments are easily incorporated. 
The scenario outlined as an example could apply to any of the 33 states in 
which the nation's 111 operating commercial nuclear reactors (as of December, 
1990) are located. Figure 15 illustrates the number of reactors in each state. 
All of the top ten dairy states (shaded in the figure) contain commercial nuclear 
reactors. Just over two-thirds of the nation's milk are produced in these ten 
states, which are also home to just over one-third of the nation's reactors. In 
a wider sense, all states are vulnerable. As Chernoby1 proved, accidents of this 
kind are not confined by arbitrary, man-made boundaries. Moreover, many of the 
nation's nuclear facilities are near the end of their estimated thirty year 
economically viable operating life (Heinze-Fry 1990). As they age, they become 
more vulnerable to component stresses and failure. There were a total of 33 
operating reactors in the Northeast at the end of 1990, 30 percent of the U.S. 
total. Of these, five reactors went on-line for the first time in the 1960s. 
The county locations of reactors in the Northeast are shown in Figure 16. 
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December 1990 U.S. Totol = 
- 2 (t.lD) 
FIGURE 15. Top Ten Dairy States and Number of Operating Nuclear Power Plant Reactors, by State, as of 
December 1989 
•	 Reactors that be9an operating 
In the 19605 
oAll others 
FIGURE 16. Northeast Nuclear Reactor County Locations 
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The disaster example given is only one scenario to which the model could 
be applied. The effects of other disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or 
widespread feed contamination (as happened in Michigan in the early 1970s) are 
others. Impacts can be assessed on a daily, weekly, monthly, or longer opera­
tional basis. Nuclear incidents of the scale discussed have foreseeably long­
term effects on animals and the environment, making a major restructuring of the 
dairy sector over a longer period advisable or desirable. Other kinds of 
disasters, such as the ones mentioned above, have great short-term consequences, 
but less or no effect in the long run. The October 1989 earthquake in 
California, for example, disrupted transportation linkages in the Bay area for 
months. Some dairy plants reported that delays in delivery time because of 
bridge, highway, and road damage from the quake, as well as power outages at the 
plants resulted in large cost burdens for the processors. Rerouting trucks 
around closed roads took more time, meaning that additional trucks and trailers 
were rented in order to deliver product on time; more overtime costs for workers 
were also incurred. A number of plants reported that even when they made 
deliveries of packaged milk products to their store customers, a number of stores 
were so damaged by the earthquake that they were unable to receive the shipments. 
Disaster researchers predict more and worse disasters in the future. The 
dairy industry, by virtue of its size and geographic diversity will eventually 
be confronted by the effects of a major disaster, whether man-made or natural, 
that will be too large for it to handle without some kind of planning and 
preparation. Given the current dearth of federal and state effort focused on 
disaster planning in the industry, it is unlikely that the dairy industry can 
depend on governmental agencies to address it in the future. More research is 
needed on general disaster planning and mitigation strategies for the dairy 
industry. Use of the NEDSS model provides a tool for assessing potential impacts 
of specified types of disasters, and a means of suggesting appropriate response 
and recovery strategies. 
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